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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Monte Moon appeals from the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. That Rule 35 motion alleged that Mr. Moon's sentence 
was illegal since the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in regard to the 
charge of escape because Mr. Moon's actions did not constitute a crime under the 
statute as it then existed. However, the district court ruled that it did not have 
"jurisdiction" to hear that claim pursuant to Rule 35. 1 Mr. Moon contends that the district 
court's decision is directly contrary to the recent Idaho Supreme Court decision in 
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837 (2011), which expressly allows for the consideration of 
such claims raised in a Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence. Therefore this 
Court should at least reverse the district court's decision and remand for the case 
further proceedings to consider the merits of Mr. Moon's claim. 
However, Mr. Moon also asserts that the record is sufficiently developed for this 
Court, like the Court in Lute, to order relief for him on merits of the issues presented. 
The face of the record demonstrates that Mr. Moon's actions were not criminalized 
under the statute as it existed at that time. Therefore, this Court should remand this 
case with an instruction to vacate Mr. Moon's conviction for escape for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
1 The district court appears to using the term "jurisdiction" in reference to whether it had 
the authority to take a certain action or grant a certain type of relief. See, e.g., 
State v. Stee/smith, 153 Idaho 577, 581 n.2 (2012) (recognizing that the term 
"jurisdiction," is often used in this manner, even though it is not entirely accurate to do 
so); State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 375 (Ct. App. 2008) (same). Since the issue 
raised by Mr. Moon's Rule 35 motion is a true challenge to jurisdiction, it is important to 
distinguish between that issue and the issue of the district court's authority to grant the 
relief requested in the Rule 35 motion. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 1996, Mr. Moon was initially charged with statutory rape. (R., p.34.) He was 
released on his own recognizance, but failed to appear for a subsequent hearing. 
(R., p.34.) The district court decided to allow Mr. Moon to continue with that release, 
but required him to wear an ankle monitor. (R., p.35.) The State subsequently charged 
him with escape pursuant to I.C. § 18-2505, alleging that "while charged with a felony 
and under house arrest, outside the walls of the Bannock County Jail, [he] did remove a 
home-monitor-device and escape." (R., p.35; Augmentation - Prosecuting Attorney's 
Information.) Mr. Moon subsequently pied guilty to the escape charge. (Augmentation 
- Minute Entry & Order filed Dec. 30, 1996.) He was sentenced to a unified term of five 
years, with three years fixed, running consecutively to his sentence for rape. 
(Augmentation - Minute Entry & Order, filed February 13, 1997.) 
Recently, Mr. Moon filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 alleging that his 
sentence is illegal because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
the charge. (R., pp.1-2.) Specifically, he claimed that the acts alleged did not constitute 
a crime under the escape statute as it existed in 1996. (R., p.1.) He based his 
argument on the fact that I.C. § 18-2505 was amended in 2007 to clarify that it did, 
in fact, criminalize absconding during pretrial release when subject to an electronic 
monitoring device, provided that the defendant was given written notice of the criminality 
of such a potential penalty. (R., p.1.) As such, Mr. Moon contended that the statute did 
not cover such actions prior to the amendment, and so his acts in 1996 did not actually 
constitute a crime. (R., pp.1-2, 19.) 
The district court, however, denied his motion, asserting that "This Court lacks 
jurisdiction over [Mr.] Moon's motion .... Nothing in Rule 35 allows a Court to overturn a 
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1. Whether the district court erroneously determined it was not authorized to 
consider Mr. Moon's claims when it was, in fact, required to do so, and so 
erroneously denied his Rule 35 motion. 
2. Whether Mr. Moon's conviction for escape should be vacated because the 
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, since Mr. Moon's actions 




The District Court Erroneously Determined It Was Not Authorized To Consider 
Mr. Moon's Claims When It Was, In Fact. Required To Do So. And So Erroneously 
Denied His Rule 35 Motion 
A Introduction 
The district court improperly determined that it did not have the authority under 
Rule 35 to consider Mr. Moon's claim. That decision is directly contrary to Lute, supra, 
wherein the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly allowed for claims challenging subject 
matter jurisdiction to be raised and addressed under Rule 35. Additionally, recent Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent requires the courts to consider claims that subject matter is 
lacking when those claims are brought to their attention, or even, to raise the issue sua 
spante when the courts become aware of such a question. Therefore, the district court 
erred when it did not recognize its authority to act on Mr. Moon's claim that the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the allegation of escape. This Court should 
reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Moon's Rule 35 motion and, at least, remand 
the case for a determination on the merits of Mr. Moon's claim. 
8. Standard Of Review 
Since the question of whether a statute grants authority to a district court is one 
of statutory construction, such questions are reviewed de nova. See, e.g., State v. Hart, 
135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001 ). Whether or not a sentence is illegal or has been imposed in 
an illegal manner is also a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. 
Lute, 150 Idaho at 839. Similarly, the question of whether jurisdiction existed is a 
question reviewed de nova. Id. 
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C. Rule 35 Is A Proper Mechanism By Which To Allege A Lack Of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction, And The District Court Is Required To Consider Such Claims When 
Brought To Its Attention 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently held that '"[J]udgments and orders made 
without subject matter jurisdiction are void and 'are subject to collateral attack .... "" 
Lute, 150 Idaho at 840 (quoting State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162-63 (2010) 
(quoting Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27 (1978))). Such a 
challenge may properly be made to the district court via a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35. Lute, 150 Idaho at 840. In Lute, the defendant "filed a 
second I.C.R. 35 motion, arguing that his sentence was invalid because the crime he 
pied guilty to was not proscribed in the Idaho Code," and that the grand jury that issued 
the indictment against him did so while sitting beyond its rightful term. Id. at 839. Since 
motions pursuant to Rule 35 may be raised at any time, see I.C.R. 35(a), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held, "[W]here a court properly has jurisdiction to consider a case-as it 
does here to consider {the defendant's] I. C.R. 35 motion-and it is apparent that there is 
an issue concerning subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant was convicted for 
something that is not a crime, this Court must correct that error." Lute, 150 Idaho at 840 
(emphasis added). Therefore, such issues are properly raised in a motion pursuant to 
Rule 35. 
Even though Lute speaks in terms of the appellate courts' ability to review the 
face of the record for subject matter jurisdiction, the Idaho Supreme Court has clarified 
the same authority exists with the district courts: "while this [C]ourt has jurisdiction, 
procedurally, to entertain an appeal, it has no greater jurisdiction of the subject matter or 
the merits than had the trial court .... The duty of this [C]ourt, upon reversing on such a 
case, would be to render such judgment as the trial court should have rendered it [sic], 
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which would be one dismissing the case." State v. Mowrey, 91 Idaho 693, 695 (1967) 
(quoting Fortier v. Fortier, 162 P.2d 438, 439 (Wash. 1945)) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, since the appellate courts have the authority to vacate a conviction for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to a Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence, 
Lute, 150 Idaho at 841, the district courts also necessarily have such authority. 
Mowrey, 91 Idaho at 695. As such, the district court's conclusion that it was not 
authorized to consider Mr. Moon's motion is revealed to be erroneous. 
Furthermore, the question of whether there was subject matter jurisdiction 
underlying a criminal charge is always a viable issue. See, e.g., State v. Olin, 153 
Idaho 891, 893 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the ability to challenge the information as 
being "jurisdictionally deficient is never waived"). In fact, if the district court becomes 
aware of a potential defect in jurisdiction, it is obligated to raise and consider that issue 
sua sponte; such errors "cannot be ignored when brought to our attention .... " 
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Mowrey, 91 
Idaho at 695 (quoting Hopkins v. Barnhardt, 27 S.E.2d 644, 645 (N.C. 1943) ("When 
there is a defect of jurisdiction, or the complaint fails to state a cause of action, that is a 
defect upon the face of the record proper ... and when such defects appear the Court 
will ex mero motu dismiss the action."). A challenge asserting no subject matter 
jurisdiction may also be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Lute, 150 Idaho at 
840; Armstrong, 146 Idaho at 377. Therefore, not only was the district court authorized 
to consider Mr. Moon's claim that there was an absence of subject matter jurisdiction in 
regard to the escape charge, it was required to do so. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 843; 
Mowrey, 91 Idaho at 695; Olin, 153 Idaho at 893. 
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Idaho's courts have clarified when a jurisdictional defect exists: "(1) the alleged 
facts are not made criminal by the statute; (2) there is a failure to state facts essential to 
establish the offense charged; (3) the alleged facts show on their face that the court has 
no jurisdiction of the charged offense; or (4) the allegations fail to show that the offense 
charged was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court." Olin, 153 Idaho at 
893; State v. Izzard, 136 Idaho 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Mr. Moon's claim falls 
squarely within the first category of defects. (R., pp.1-2; see also R., p.19 ("Defendant 
has lodged a Criminal Rule 35 Motion before this Court whereby alleging that this Court 
lacked jurisdiction to imposed [sic] a sentence upon him for a criminal offense that was 
not a criminal offense as defined by any Idaho Statute during the time in which the 
alleged criminal offense was alleged to have been committed.") As such, his motion 
raised a viable claim that the district court could not refuse to address. See, e.g., Lute, 
150 Idaho at 840; Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 843; Olin, 153 Idaho at 893. 
The district court attempted to justify its decision by relying on Housely v. State, 
119 Idaho 885 (Ct. App. 1991), State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963 (Ct. App. 1997), and 
State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718 (Ct. App. 2003). (R., p.36.) Those cases do, indeed, state 
that Rule 35 is not the proper mechanism by which such claims should be raised. 
See Housely, 119 Idaho at 889; McDonald, 130 Idaho at 965; Self, 139 Idaho at 725; 
see also State v. Bumright, 132 Idaho 654, 657 n.1 (1999); State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 
836, 841-42 (Ct. App. 2001 ). However, these cases are inconsistent with the Idaho 
Supreme Court's more recent holdings on the subject, which explicitly rejected the 
rationale from those cases: "[W]here a court properly has jurisdiction to consider a 
case-as it does here to consider [the defendant's] /.C.R. 35 motion-and it is apparent 
that there is an issue concerning subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant was 
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convicted for something that is not a crime, this Court must correct that error." Lute, 
150 Idaho at 840 (emphasis added). Furthermore, "the failure of an indictment to 
charge a crime is a fundamental defect that can be raised at any time." Kavajecz, 139 
Idaho at 484 (quoting State v. Byington, 135 Idaho 621, 624 (Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis 
added). Therefore, subsequent decisions have made it clear that the rationale in 
House/y, et al., is no longer good law. Furthermore, when considering previous conflicts 
of precedent on this issue, the Court of Appeals made it clear that the most recent 
expression by the Idaho Supreme Court controls. State v. Doe, 139 Idaho 344, 347 
(Ct. App. 2003). Currently, Lute is the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent 
pronouncement on this subject, and therefore, it controls. See Doe, 139 Idaho at 347. 
As such, the district court's assertion that it was not authorized to consider 
Mr. Moon's claim that there was no subject matter jurisdiction underlying the original 
charge was erroneous. See Lute, 150 Idaho at 840; Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 484. As a 
result, that decision should be reversed and the case remanded, at least for a 
determination on the merits of Mr. Moon's claims, if not for an order vacating the 
conviction entered without subject matter jurisdiction. 
II. 
Mr. Moon's Conviction For Escape Should Be Vacated Because The District Court Did 
Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Since Mr. Moon's Actions Did Not Constitute A 
Crime Under The Statute As It Existed At That Time 
A. Introduction 
When the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is clear from the record, this Court 
has the ability to grant the defendant relief by ordering the conviction based on such a 
charge to be vacated. In this case, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is clear on the 
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record because the actions alleged in this case to be criminal were not criminal under 
the plain language of the statute. In fact, at the time Mr. Moon was charged, the statute 
did not extend to situations like Mr. Moon's, as evidenced by subsequent amendments 
to the statute. Therefore, because those actions were not criminalized under that 
statute, the document alleging those actions to violate that statute failed to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction on the district court to hear that case. As a result, this Court 
should order that the conviction for escape, for which there was no subject matter 
jurisdiction, should be vacated on remand. 
B. The Conviction For Escape Should Be Vacated Because Of The Lack Of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction 
Idaho's appellate courts have made clear what is necessary in order for the 
district court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal allegation: '"The 
information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the 
State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court." Lute, 150 Idaho at 
840 (quoting State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 224, 228 (2004)). "[A] jurisdictional defect 
exists when: (1) the alleged facts are not made criminal by the statute; (2) there is a 
failure to state facts essential to establish the offense charged; (3) the alleged facts 
show on their face that the court has no jurisdiction of the charged offense; or (4) the 
allegations fail to show that the offense charged was committed w/in the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court." Olin, 153 Idaho at 893; Izzard, 136 Idaho at 127. Errors in 
this regard which are challenged via Rule 35(a) must be clear from the face of the 
record. State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837 (2012); State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 
(2009). 
10 
Furthermore, "[w]hen there is a defect of jurisdiction, or the complaint fails to 
state a cause of action, that is a defect upon the face of the record proper ... and when 
such defects appear the Court will ex mero motu dismiss the action." Mowrey, 91 Idaho 
at 695 (quoting Hopkins, 27 S.E. 2d at 645). The face of the record in this case 
demonstrates that the alleged facts were not criminalized by the escape statute as it 
existed when Mr. Moon was alleged to have violated it, and therefore, subject matter 
jurisdiction was never conferred upon the district court. 
In 1996, the escape statute provided: 
Every prisoner charged with, convicted of, or on probation for a felony who is 
confined in any jail or prison including the state penitentiary, or who while 
outside the walls of such jail or prison in the proper custody of any officer or 
person, or while in any factory, farm or other place without the walls of such 
jail or prison, who escapes or attempts to escape from such officer or person, 
or from such jail or prison, or from such factory, farm or other place without 
the walls of such jail or prison, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction 
thereof, any such second term of imprisonment shall commence at the time 
he would otherwise have been discharged. 
I.C. § 18-2505(1), 1995 Idaho Laws Ch. 74. That statute was amended in 2007, and the 
following definition of "escape" was added after the language quoted above: 
Escape includes the intentional act of leaving the area of restriction set 
forth in a court order admitting a person to bail or release on a person's 
own recognizance with electronic or global positioning system tracking, 
monitoring and detention . . . . A person may not be charged with the 
crime of escape for leaving the aforementioned area of restriction unless 
the person was notified in writing by the court at the time of setting of bail, 
release or sentencing of the consequences of violating this section by 
intentionally leaving the area of restriction. 
I.C. § 18-2505(1), 2007 Idaho Laws Ch. 114. The express purpose of the 2007 
amendment was "to clarify that persons on bail or sentencing orders that intentionally 
leave the area of restriction set forth by a court as part of a home detention, electronic 
monitoring, or global positioning tracking order, can be charged with the criminal offense 
of escape." 2007 Idaho Laws Ch. 114, Statement of Purpose. That clarification was 
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necessary because, under the plain language of the statute as it existed prior, a person 
in that particular situation could not violate the statute. 
In State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 155 (Ct. App. 2003), the Court of Appeals 
engaged in an exercise of statutory construction over I.C. §18-2505(1), examining to 
which situations the statute applied. It held: "The third element of § 18-2505(1) 
encompasses prisoners who are: (a) confined in a correctional facility, or (b) in custody 
'outside the walls of such correctional facility,' or (c) in a factory, farm or other place 
without walls of such correctional facility." Shanks, 139 Idaho at 155. The Court of 
Appeals concluded: "If this element is satisfied whenever anyone convicted or charged 
with a felony is outside the walls of a correctional facility and in the custody of an officer 
or person, then the statute's disjunctive list of three separate location categories from 
which an escape may occur would be rendered superfluous." Id. (emphasis added). As 
such, the mere fact of being outside the prison and in the custody of another (i.e. 
released from a penal facility on one's own recognizance subjected to electronic 
monitoring by another), would not qualify as a situation from which that person could 
effect an escape as contemplated by the statute. Id. The Court of Appeals explained: 
This is so because the alternative circumstances of being in any 
correctional facility and being in custody outside the walls of a corrections 
facility exhaust all logical possibilities with regard to a correctional facility: 
one must either be inside or outside a correctional facility. If the 
legislature intended this breadth of coverage, it could have simply made 
the statute applicable to all prisoners charged with, convicted of, or on 
probation for a felony who are in the custody of an officer or other person. 
To give the statute such a broad application in the face of the legislature's 
careful articulation of three alternative types of locations from which an 
escape may occur could violate a fundamental tenet of statutory 
interpretation that courts should strive "to give effect to {every} word, 
clause and sentence of a statute" so as not to render parts superfluous or 
without meaning. 
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Id. (quoting Univ. of Utah Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 248 (1980)) 
(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals then discussed the specific construction of the 
statute: "We find significant the legislature's use of the word, 'such,' in the phrase 
'outside the walls of such correctional facility.' The adjective, 'such,' means 'Of 
that kind; of the same or like kind; identical with or similar to something specified or 
implied; ... being the same as what has been mentioned or indicated ... .' Id. (quoting 
In re Hull, 18 Idaho 475, 480 (1910)). Therefore, according to the Court of Appeals, it 
was significant that the situation of being outside the walls of a penal facility was listed 
alongside two situations designating situations where the person remained in the 
custody and control of the Department of Corrections (in a correctional facility (implying 
a walled penitentiary) or factory or farm without walls). 
Applying that rationale, the person would have had to be in the direct custody 
and control of the Department of Correction , though not necessarily a prison, in order to 
effect an escape, and still give meaning to each of the three specified locations (a 
correctional facility, a factory or farm associated with a penal facility, or the custody of 
an approved agent outside the walls). See I.C. § 18-2505(1). The situation described 
by "outside the walls in the custody of an officer or person," when considered in light of 
the Shanks decision, is more akin to a work release scenario or to transport to and from 
the courthouse or between penal facilities. Essentially, it would apply to situations 
where the subject is required to stay in prison but is permitted to be outside the facility 
if he is with an approved agent of the Department (his work release supervisor or the 
officer overseeing the transport). Compare State v. Rocque, 104 Idaho 445,446 (1983) 
(holding that a probationer with a voluntary agreement to be confined in jail at nights did 
not "escape" as contemplated in I.C. § 18-2505(1) when he did not return pursuant to 
13 
that agreement; at most, he had violated the terms of his probation). This interpretation 
of I.C. § 18-2505 is consistent with the overall scheme of the Idaho Code. See, e.g. 
State v. Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 24 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a defendant who, during 
the pretrial proceedings, was allowed to stay under house arrest subject to electronic 
monitoring, was not entitled to credit for that time against his ultimate sentence because 
of the freedoms he enjoyed in that situation).2 
Applied to Mr. Moon's case, it is evident that he was not in any of the three 
locations from which he could effect an escape under the statute as it existed at that 
time. Since he was under house arrest (see Augmentation - Prosecuting Attorney's 
Information), he was not incarcerated at a correctional facility, he was not restricted to a 
farm or factory associated with a correctional facility, and he was not outside the walls 
as contemplated by the statute (as the Court of Appeals would subsequently explain in 
Shanks). Compare Climer, 127 Idaho at 24. Mr. Moon's situation was more akin to that 
in Rocque, where he was not required to return to the penal facility, and so could not 
commit the crime of escape; at most, he may have violated the terms of his pretrial 
release and been subject to having that privilege revoked. Compare Rocque, 104 Idaho 
at 446. His actions did not, however, constitute the separate offense of escape under 
the law as it existed at that time. 
Therefore, since Mr. Moon's actions were not criminalized by the statute as it 
existed at that time, the charging document in that regard failed to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction for that alleged offense on the district court. Olin, 153 Idaho at 893; Izzard, 
2 If the subject is not sufficiently in custody so as to accrue credit against a potential 
sentence, he would not be sufficiently in custody to effect an escape, as contemplated 
by I.C. § 18-2505(1), as it existed at that time. Hence the need for the Legislature to 
amend the statute to include such situations within the scope of I.C. § 18-2505(1). 
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136 Idaho at 127. As demonstrated supra, that error is clear from the face of the 
record; no additional fact finding is necessary. As such, this Court should not only 
reverse the district court's order denying the Rule 35 motion, but should also, as the 
Idaho Supreme Court did in Lute, remand this case "with instruction to vacate [the] 
conviction on the basis that no valid indictment or information was returned in the case 
and, as such, the district court never properly had jurisdiction to hear it." Lute, 150 
Idaho at 841. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moon respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his Rule 35 motion. He also respectfully requests this Court remand the case 
with instructions to vacate the conviction for escape for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. If this Court determines that there is insufficient evidence in the record to 
make that determination, Mr. Moon alternatively requests that this Court remand the 
case with instructions for the district court to consider the merits of his claims. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 201 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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